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The United Nations has been incapable of authorizing an 
international response to stop the mass atrocities taking place in the 
Syrian Civil War. This has led some concerned nations to argue for a 
unilateral military operation based upon the controversial international 
legal concept titled humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian 
intervention provides a distinct legal basis for the use of force when 
there is a moral obligation to protect victims of war crimes, genocide, or 
other crimes against humanity. This is in contrast to the more 
conservative approach known as the Responsibility to Protect. Despite 
the obvious appeal of invoking a progressive use of force doctrine in 
Syria, relying on moral authority to authorize military action raises a 
particularly troubling international law question: What keeps an 
aggressive state from invading another nation under the pretext of 
stopping a “humanitarian crisis”? The legal justifications for the recent 
military acts by the Russian Federation in the Ukraine’s Crimean 
Peninsula starkly illustrate the impossibility of objectively answering this 
question. The Ukrainian crisis has instead demonstrated that 
determining when a humanitarian intervention is necessitated is a 
subjective and political decision. It is this subjectivity which underscores 
the logic of the post-World War II jus contra bellum prohibition on acts 
of aggression and why using a moral argument to legally justify the use 
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of military force dramatically increases the potential for a new age of 
nation-state warfare.  
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Many voices inside and outside of Syria have stated that the 
international community and the Syrian government have both failed in 
their responsibility to protect Syrians, a failure that, particularly in 
light of the alleged attacks, has reached what some are calling a 
tipping point and requires an immediate and meaningful response.1 
The atrocities associated with the ongoing Syrian Civil War shock the 
conscience: over 190,000 people dead, millions of refugees and 
displaced persons, and the annihilation of entire communities.2 Yet it is 
the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime on its own people that 
illustrates just how far the conflict has devolved into brutality and 
savagery. This “moral obscenity,” as Secretary of State Kerry called the 
  
 1. The Crisis in Syria, INT’L COAL. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-
syria. 
 2. See Syrian civil war death toll rises to more than 191,300, according to UN, 
THE GUARDIAN (Aug, 22, 2014), 
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/22/syria-civil-war-death-toll-191300-un.  
See also Sam Dagher, Syrian Regime Chokes Off Food to Town that Was Gassed, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2013),  
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303492504579111662761701676 
(explaining that the Syrian regime continues to commit atrocities with attempts to isolate 
and starve 12,000 civilians in the town of Moadhamiya). 
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chemical weapon use, dramatically intensified discussions within the 
international community on how to punish the Assad government while 
simultaneously stopping the violence.3 
The Syrian’s callous disregard for the longstanding international norm 
against the use of chemical weapons has resulted in this moral outrage.4 
However, the traditional view of international law is careful about 
conflating moral authority with legality making the legal justification for 
the use of force in Syria highly questionable.5 The United Nations 
Charter, which regulates the use of force by all nations, expressly states 
in Article 2, paragraph 4 that “all members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”6 This broad 
prohibition on the use of military force is an absolute rule with only two 
exceptions:7 if the U.N. Security Council authorizes military action8 or if 
a state is acting under its inherent right of individual or collective self-
  
 3. Michael R. Gordon & Mark Landler, Kerry Cites Clear Evidence of Chemical 
Weapon Use in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2013),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/world/middleeast/syria-
assad.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 4. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL 
NORM AGAINST THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (2013) (discussing the longstanding and 
unequivocal international prohibition against the chemical weapons); see also Michael N. 
Schmitt, The Syrian Intervention: Assessing the Possible International Law 
Justifications, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 744, 749-51 (2013) (explaining why the Syrian violation 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention does not justify an international military response). 
 5. See Schmitt, supra note 4, at 746 (concluding “that there is no unassailable 
legal basis for” U.S. military operations in Syria); Kenneth Anderson, Legality of 
Intervention in Syria in Response to Chemical Weapons Attacks, 17 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L 
L INSIGHTS, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/21/legality-
intervention-syria-response-chemical-weapon-attacks. 
 6. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.  
 7. In recent comments concerning Syria, the U.N. Secretary General has 
reiterated that these remain the only two exceptions to the use of force. See U.N. 
Secretary-General, Press Encounter on Syria (Sept. 3, 2013),  
http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=2967 (“The use of force is lawful only 
when in exercise of self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter and/or when the Security Council approves such action.”). 
 8. U.N. Charter art. 39.  
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defense.9 As there is no U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing 
action in Syria and no international actor can justifiably claim either 
form of self-defense, the use of military force is legally prohibited by 
existing international law.10 
Frustrated by this traditional legal interpretation, and appalled at the 
barbarity taking place in Syria, many argue that the moral imperative to 
stop the humanitarian crisis trumps a technical reading of the law.11 
Others go further and argue that this moral obligation to act triggers an 
alternative legal concept titled humanitarian intervention.12 Based upon 
the same theoretical underpinnings as the concept of Responsibility to 
Protect (“R2P”), but not limited by the same pragmatic limitations,13 
humanitarian intervention provides a distinct legal basis for the use of 
force when there is a moral obligation to protect victims of war crimes, 
genocide, or other crimes against humanity.14 Humanitarian intervention, 
  
 9. Id. art. 51. When a state can justifiably exercise its right of self-defense is 
debatable and outside the scope of this paper. For a more detailed discussion see 
generally INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 35-40 
(William J. Johnson & Andrew D. Gillman eds., 2012) [hereinafter DESKBOOK] 
(discussing the various views on the inherent right of self-defense in jus ad bellum). 
 10. See Anderson, supra note 5. Professor Anderson notes that “neither the 
United States nor its allies have themselves been attacked” and thus there is “no basis for 
invoking individual self-defense.” Id. Additionally, he concludes that the United States 
cannot act under any theory of collective self-defense as it is the prerogative of the U.N. 
Security Council to determine if a state poses a threat to international peace and security, 
which it has not done in this particular case. Id. See also Schmitt, supra note 4, at 747 
(stating “there is no basis for immediate or anticipatory self or collective self defense 
against a paradigmatic armed attack.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Ian Hurd, Bomb Syria, Even If It Is Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 
2013),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/opinion/bomb-syria-even-if-it-is-illegal.html?_r=0 
(“There are moral reasons for disregarding the law, and I believe the Obama 
administration should intervene in Syria. But it should not pretend that there is a legal 
justification in existing law.”). 
 12. Anderson, supra note 5 (discussing options outside of the traditional 
international law for military action in Syria). 
 13. See infra text and accompanying notes 21-57 for a discussion on the 
differences between R2P and humanitarian intervention.  
 14. Majorie Cohn, The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, in 
LESSONS OF KOSOVO: DANGERS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 121, 137–38 
(Alexsander Jokic ed., 2001) (citing KENJI URATA, CRITICISM OF “HUMANITARIAN 
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unlike R2P, thus allows for a unilateral use of military force based solely 
upon the moral imperative to stop an ongoing crisis.15 Believing that 
such a moral obligation currently exists in Syria, these proponents argue 
this “third” exception to Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is clearly 
applicable.  
Yet despite the obvious appeal of invoking a progressive use of force 
doctrine in Syria, relying on moral authority to authorize military action 
raises a number of international legal questions. For example, what 
makes Syria’s circumstances different than the slaughter in Darfur or the 
enslavement, torture, and starvation of the millions in North Korea? 
When does the moral responsibility that justified the intervention end? 
Who is responsible for governing if there is regime change? Of all the 
unanswered questions perhaps the most troubling is what keeps an 
aggressive state from invading another nation under the pretext of 
stopping a “humanitarian crisis”? Despite efforts to define when the right 
to a humanitarian intervention is triggered,16 the legal justifications for 
the recent military acts by the Russian Federation in the Ukraine’s 
Crimean Peninsula starkly illustrate the impossibility of objectively 
answering this question.17 The Ukrainian crisis has instead demonstrated 
  
INTERVENTION”: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 58 (2001)) (“The 
general notion of humanitarian intervention is the use of force or threat of force by third 
countries, individually or collectively, to protect people from a government which 
continuously and arbitrarily subjects people living in its own territory to inhumane 
treatment.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government Legal 
Position, GOV.UK (Aug. 29, 2013),  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-
uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-
legal-position-html-version#contents (noting that the UK is permitted to intervene in 
Syria under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention).  
 16. See infra text and accompanying note 49-53 (discussing the U.K.’s conditions 
which must be met before the right to intervene for humanitarian purposes is triggered). 
 17. See, e.g., Transcript: Putin defends Russian Intervention in Ukraine, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 4, 2014), available at  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-defends-russian-intervention-in-
ukraine/2014/03/04/9 cadcd1a-a3a9-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html (explaining that 
the intervention in the Ukraine is based upon a request for aid by the deposed legitimate 
government as well as for various humanitarian purposes including protecting citizens 
from anti-Semitic violence). 
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that determining when a humanitarian intervention is necessitated is a 
subjective and political decision.18 It is this subjectivity which 
underscores the logic of the post-World War II jus contra bellum 
prohibition on acts of aggression19 and why using a moral argument to 
legally justify the use of military force dramatically increases the 
potential for a new age of nation-state warfare.  
This article will support this proposition by first exploring the shared 
history of R2P and humanitarian intervention to highlight how the 
doctrines diverged on the question of unilateral use of military force in a 
mass atrocity situation. In contrast to R2P, humanitarian intervention 
equates the moral imperative to stop an ongoing mass atrocity with legal 
justification, and thus, a discussion on the associated problems with this 
position and the risks of creating legal authority based upon moral 
judgments will follow. The article will conclude that finding an 
independent legal basis for use of force outside the existing jus ad bellum 
construct20 is ill-advised as it may harbor a return to the international 
Darwinism that led to the wars of annihilation in the 20th Century. 
  
 18. See Alison Smale & Steven Erlanger, Ukraine Mobilizes Reserve Troops, 
Threatening War, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2014), available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=0 (noting that 
President Obama has called the invasion of the Ukraine a violation of international law 
while the Russians claim they are attempting to avert a “humanitarian catastrophe” as a 
justification for the territorial violation). 
 19. See Raphael Van Steenberghe, The Law against War or Jus contra Bellum: A 
New Terminology for a Conservative View on the Use of Force, 24 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L 
747, 748 (2011) (referring to the basic rule, as outlined in the U.N. charter, that wars of 
aggression are prohibited in contemporary international relations); see also THE CHARTER 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 117 (Bruno Simma & Hermann Mosler eds., 
2d ed. 2002). 
 20. The jus ad bellum lays the framework for when a state actor may resort to 
war. See Shane R. Reeves & David Lai, A Broad Overview of the Law of Armed Conflict 
in the Age of Terror, in THE FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 139, 141 
(Lynne Zusman ed.). This body of law is governed by the United Nations Charter which 
only allows for the use of force in cases of self-defense or if condoned by the collective 
judgment of the international community. Id. 
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II.  R2P OR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION? 
In the contemporary lexicon “R2P” and “humanitarian intervention” 
are often used interchangeably and generally understood as the same 
controversial “third” exception to the rule of non-intervention established 
in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.21 Despite the increasing merger of the 
two terms in usage, the concepts are distinct, with R2P referencing the 
moral obligation to prevent mass atrocities while humanitarian 
intervention is an international legal concept, which arguably justifies the 
unilateral use of military force to advert a crisis.22 A short discussion on 
the common background between humanitarian intervention and R2P 
illustrates their distinct approaches to the use of military force.  
The 1999 NATO bombing campaign of Kosovo, known as Operation 
Allied Force, was a military operation conducted outside the U.N. 
traditional use of force framework and defended as a humanitarian 
intervention.23 Rightly interpreted as a novel exception to the U.N. 
Charter’s general prohibition on the use of force,24 this extra-legal 
military operation was “far from celebrated” and caused grave worries 
  
 21. See, e.g., DESKBOOK, supra note 9, at 31(noting that humanitarian 
intervention and Responsibility to Protect are synonymous); Mark Kersten, Whose R2P Is 
It? The Responsibility to Protect Post-Syria, JUST. IN CONFLICT, (Sept. 3, 2013),  
http://justiceinconflict.org/2013/09/03/whose-r2p-is-it-the-responsibility-to-protect-post-
syria/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (discussing different views on R2P including the belief 
that it is the equivalent to a separate legal basis for use of force). 
 22. See GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS 
ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 44 (2008) (noting that R2P is more than simply 
another name for humanitarian intervention); Schmitt, supra note 4, at 752-55. 
 23. See generally Marjorie Cohn, United States Violation of International Law in 
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, in CHALLENGES OF MULTI-LEVEL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
233, 234 (Nergelius, Policastro & Urata eds., 2004) (stating “NATO purposely bypassed 
the UN, and in so doing, violated the Charter of the United Nations.”); see Eve 
Massingham, Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes: Does the Responsibility 
to Protect Doctrine Advance the Legality of the Use of Force for Humanitarian Ends?, 
91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 803, 810-15 (2009) (detailing history of humanitarian 
interventions conducted without U.N. approval). 
 24. See Cohn, supra note 23, at 237 (noting “the general notion of humanitarian 
intervention is the use of force or threat of force by third countries, individually or 
collectively, to protect people from a government which continuously and arbitrarily 
subjects people living in its own territory to inhumane treatment”). 
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amongst the international community about the traditional principles of 
non-intervention and state sovereignty.25 Simultaneous with these 
concerns, however, was a growing recognition that emphasis on state 
sovereignty often acted as a defense for internal mass atrocities leading 
then U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to comment “if humanitarian 
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity?”26 In answering this question the international 
community, first through the finding of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty27 and later with a 2004 Report titled 
“A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,”28 began to coalesce 
around the idea that state sovereignty could not act as an absolute shield 
from military intervention when mass atrocities were taking place.29  
  
 25. Anderson, supra note 5, at 3 (“[F]ar from celebrating the new 
humanitarianism that the United States and NATO believed they found in the 1999 
Kosovo intervention, [the international community was] gravely worried by it.”). 
 26. See Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 
The Responsibility to Protect, ¶ VII, 
(Int’l Dev. Res. Centre, Ottawa, 2001),  
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (last visited 8 Oct. 2013). 
 27. See id. (describing the mandate of the Commission as an attempt to “build a 
broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection 
purposes and sovereignty.”); see generally Evans, supra note 22 (discussing that 
simultaneous with a state’s right to self-government comes a concomitant obligation to 
protect its population). 
 28. Rep. of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, 
and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 
(2004) [hereinafter Our Shared Responsibility], available at  
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf 
(discussing, in Part III, the collective use of force to stop mass atrocities and endorsing 
the idea of a “responsibility to protect”). 
 29. Id. at 66 (“We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective 
international responsibility to protect . . . in the event of genocide or other large-scale 
killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which 
sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.”).  
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In an attempt to reconcile this emerging norm with the long-
established belief in the inviolability of state sovereignty30 a pragmatic 
compromise was struck in the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document.31 While the document, which was later endorsed by U.N. 
  
 30. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . but this principle shall not prejudice the application 
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101 (1987) (defining international law as “rules 
and principles of general application dealing with the conduct of States and of 
international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as some of their 
relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.”). 
 31. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). Those paragraphs provide as follows: 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through 
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility 
and will act in accordance with it. The international community 
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an 
early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, 
also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need 
for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its 
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as 
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Security Council Resolution 1674,32 recognized the existence of a 
responsibility to protect victims of mass atrocities, it did so without 
creating a novel legal justification for military intervention.33 Titled 
appropriately “Responsibility to Protect,” or “R2P,” the concept, as 
articulated in the document, obligates a state to prevent internal acts of 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.34 
The international community, for its part, is to help and encourage 
compliance with this responsibility to protect and, in circumstances 
where a state is unwilling or incapable of complying, is authorized to 
intervene to stop the mass atrocities.35 However, fearful of inadvertently 
providing justification for unilateral state action, the international 
community deliberately chose a “gradual, cautious evolution toward R2P 
strictly within the Security Council.”36 As a result R2P, though 
recognizing the moral obligation to stop mass atrocities, does not provide 
an “independent legal basis for using force to intervene in another 
[s]tate.”37  
As the responsibility to protect only allows for the international 
community to use military force with Security Council approval, R2P is 
best understood as a government’s moral obligation to prevent internal 
mass atrocities against their populations and not as a unique code 
necessitating international military intervention.38 This contemporary 
  
necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those 
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.  
 32. S.C. Res. 1674, ¶4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (reaffirming 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document).  
 33. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 31.  
 34. Id. ¶ 139. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Anderson, supra note 5. 
 37. Schmitt, supra note 4, at 753; see also 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. 
Res. 60/1, ¶ 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
 38. See Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 
Statement at an Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect: United 
States Mission to the United Nations (Sept. 11, 2013), available at  
http://usun.state.gov/briefing /statements/214066.htm (discussing the validity of the 
Responsibility to Protect as a doctrine to prevent mass atrocities but not necessarily as a 
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version of R2P, while providing moral legitimacy to the idea of 
preventing mass atrocities, is often criticized as ineffectual in stopping an 
ongoing humanitarian crisis.39 Believing that “in order [to] secure 
consensus, the concept’s advocates [] abandoned many of its central 
tenets,” including creative options to circumvent a deadlocked Security 
Council,40 critics view the compromised version of R2P as a 
reinforcement of the status quo. As the status quo, and particularly 
Security Council intransigence when confronted with a humanitarian 
crisis, was the very reason for the inception of R2P, 41 continued reliance 
on a system that is “neither very consistent nor very effective in dealing 
with these cases, very often acting too late, too hesitantly or not at all” is 
dismissed by some as an inadequate solution to the mass atrocity 
problem.42  
The Security Council deliberations on the current Syrian crisis have 
seemingly validated the criticism of the “watered down” version of 
R2P43 as both Russia and China have obstructed any international 
intervention to stop the violence.44 Samantha Powers, the U.S. 
ambassador to the U.N., has condemned Russia for “continu[ing] to hold 
the council hostage and shirk[ing] its international responsibilities” by 
  
justification for a military intervention); Schmitt, supra note 4, at 753 (“It must be 
emphasized that R2P is a political mechanism and moral imperative, not a legal 
obligation or right.”). 
 39. See generally Kersten, supra note 21.  
 40. Alex J. Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian 
Intervention and the 2005 World Summit, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 143, 146, 168 
(2006). 
 41. See Massingham, supra note 23, at 810 (discussing the reasons behind the 
genesis of the Responsibility to Protect concept).  
 42. Our Shared Responsibility, supra note 28, at ¶ 202. 
 43. See Bellamy, supra note 40, at 144-45 (noting that many scholars have 
argued that the responsibility to protect is “watered down” and incapable of addressing 
humanitarian disasters); Paul R. Williams, J. Trevor Ulbrick & Jonathan Worboys, 
Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis, 45 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 473, 479-80 (2012) (discussing why the Responsibility to Protect 
concept developed). 
 44. See, e.g., Louis Charbonneau, U.S. Gives up on U.N. Security Council in 
Syria Crisis, Blames Russia, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2013), available at  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/us-syria-crisis-un-usa-idUSBRE98 40W420 
130 905. 
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their threat to veto any measure allowing for intervention into Syria.45 
Yet the simple, and often frustrating, truth is that the Security Council 
veto system purposefully allows for a permanent member to unilaterally 
block international action even if it may mean a state commits mass 
atrocity crimes against their own citizens.46 Under existing international 
law, any intervention, including an exercise of R2P, without a UN 
mandate may perhaps be “right, necessary, and humane” yet remain 
illegal.47 The gap between moral and legal justification for military 
intervention is particularly troubling to those acutely aware of the 
continuing savagery in Syria. For this reason a separate humanitarian 
intervention “exception” to the traditional use of force paradigm has 
reemerged as a distinct and separate concept from the contemporary 
version of R2P.48  
Proponents of action in Syria are again arguing “that there exists a 
right to intervene within the territory of another state (without that state’s 
consent, and without [Security Council] authorization) in order to 
prevent certain large scale atrocities or deprivations.”49 Particularly vocal 
in embracing the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is the U.K., 
which openly states that the concept provides legal justification for a 
  
 45. See id. (“In the wake of the flagrant shattering of the international norm 
against chemical weapons use, Russia continues to hold the council hostage and shirk its 
international responsibilities, including as a party to the chemical weapons convention.”). 
 46. Williams, Ulbrick & Worboys, supra note 43, at 476. But see GEOFFREY S. 
CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 27 (2012) 
(discussing the first successful “exercise of R2P” by the United Nations in March 2011 to 
stop the Libyan state from killing civilians who were attempting to overthrow the 
Qaddafi regime).  
 47. David Kaye, The Legal Consequences of Illegal Wars, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
SNAPSHOT 3 (Aug. 29, 2013), available at  
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139886/david-kaye/the-legal-consequences-of-
illegal-wars (stating that an intervention in Syria may be moral and just “but it won’t be 
legal, and no creative amount of lawyering can make it so”). 
 48. Massingham, supra note 23, at 825 (“Indeed the R2P effectively concedes 
that morally legitimate but illegal military interventions will continue to take place in 
order to protect populations due to inactivity by the Security Council.”).  
 49. CORN ET AL., supra note 46, at 27. 
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military operation against Syria.50 The U.K. has gone so far as to 
articulate the conditions that trigger the legal right to intervene for 
humanitarian purposes. These conditions include:  
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the 
international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress 
on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief; 
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to 
the use of force if lives are to be saved; and 
(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to 
the aim of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in 
time and scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that 
end and for no other purpose).51 
Professor Michael Schmitt notes that there is arguably a fourth 
criterion—”the intervention must be likely to significantly alleviate the 
suffering to a degree not possible through non-forceful measures”—prior 
to a legal humanitarian intervention.52 Assuming these conditions are 
met, humanitarian interventionists believe that international law allows 
for military action “to alleviate the scale of the overwhelming 
humanitarian catastrophe in Syria” even if action is blocked in the 
Security Council.53 
  
 50. UK Prime Minister, Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK 
Government Legal Position, GOV.UK (Aug. 29, 2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-
uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-
legal-position-html-version [hereinafter UK Government Legal Position] (discussing how 
eventually the U.K. Parliament rejected the idea of intervening in Syria). See Syrian 
Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria Action, BBC, available at  
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-23892783 (last visited Mar. 18, 2014). 
 51. UK Government Legal Position, supra note 50. 
 52. Schmitt, supra note 4, at 754-55.  
 53. UK Government Legal Position, supra note 50. 
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Whether humanitarian intervention is a legal justification for violating 
state sovereignty remains an extremely controversial issue.54 Yet for 
those who believe state actors are morally obligated to intervene to avert 
a humanitarian crisis this is not a difficult question.55 To humanitarian 
interventionists moral legitimacy equates to legal justification regardless 
of the Security Council deliberations.56 While this clearly expedites use 
of force decisions, a humanitarian intervention is not without 
consequence. The moral legitimacy of a military intervention, even if 
widely accepted by the international community, requires a subjective 
determination that an offending state is violating their fundamental 
obligations. This determination, done outside of the collective judgment 
of the Security Council, allows individual states the future discretion to 
determine when a humanitarian intervention is a moral imperative and 
legally justified. Thus, while the legal concept of humanitarian 
intervention may allow for a solution to an immediate crisis, such as that 
in Syria, it may also allow for an opportunist state, such as Russia, to 
exploit the amorphous nature of morality to justify an intervention into a 
coveted territory, such as the Ukraine, for geographic or political 
  
 54. See Schmitt, supra note 4, at 752-54 (discussing whether humanitarian 
intervention as a legal concept, though not discussed in any conventional law, “has 
crystallized into customary law over the past decades”); CORN ET AL., supra note 46, at 
27-28 (“[T]he international community is still deeply divided on the legality of 
humanitarian intervention.”). One alternative argument is that a humanitarian 
intervention does not violate Article 2(4) “because the purpose is not to affect the 
territorial integrity or political independence of the State.” Id. at 27. As a result, “the 
intervening State bears the heavy burden of proving its ‘pure motive’” with any 
aggressive perceptions undermining the intervention. Id. This is a questionable assertion 
as any intervention will violate the territorial integrity of a state acting contrary to the 
well-established belief in the inviolability of state sovereignty. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 
7. Additionally, the purpose of the intervention will undoubtedly be to depose the 
political rulers responsible for the atrocities.  
 55. See, e.g., UK Government Legal Position, supra note 50 (stating that even if 
the United Nations blocked a resolution to act in Syria “the UK would still be permitted 
under international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate the scale of the 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by deterring and disrupting the further 
use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime.”). 
 56. See Massingham, supra note 23, at 825.  
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purposes.57 The potential risks to the international order of allowing 
decentralized use of force decisions based upon subjective moral 
judgments is therefore obvious and requires a more detailed analysis.  
III. IS THERE A CONNECTION BETWEEN LAW AND MORALITY IN USE OF 
FORCE DETERMINATIONS?  
Whether there is a necessary connection between law and morality is 
a long-standing debate amongst legal philosophers.58 On one side are 
natural law theorists who assert that a connection does exist. To these 
natural law adherents there are moral rules or principles that inform any 
legitimate body of law.59 Written, or positive law, must be in congruity 
with these moral principles or it is deemed “immoral,” “wrong,” or 
“unjust.”60 If the positive law is disconnected from the prevailing view of 
morality there are a variety of natural law responses. A “traditional” 
natural law theorist will ignore the immoral positive law as they believe 
“there can be laws that are so unjust, so socially detrimental that . . . their 
very character as laws [] must be denied.”61 To a “new” natural law 
  
 57. See, e.g., Harriet Torry & Bertrand Benoit, Watchdog Sees No Threat to 
Ethnic Russians, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2014, at A10 (noting that the Council of Europe, 
an organization that eschews political judgment, made clear that there was no legal 
justification for Russia’s intervention into Crimea and quoting Thorbjorn Jagland, 
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, as saying “[w]e don’t actually see any signs 
of real threat to the minorities or the Russian majorities [in Ukraine]”).  
 58. This topic, and particularly how the post-World War II German legal system 
should respond to Nazi crimes, was famously debated in the 1958 Harvard Law Review 
between the preeminent legal positivist H.L.A. Hart and the equally well-known natural 
law theorist Lon Fuller. Compare H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958), with Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A 
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). The debate stands as the most 
important discussion on these topics and remains extraordinarily relevant in the 
contemporary legal environment. For a more detailed discussion see Editorial Board, 
Foreword: 50 Years Later, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993 (2008).  
 59. See ANDREW ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 42 (2nd ed. 2001) (“[N]atural law claims to be universally valid, imposing 
obligations on every individual in every country and historical era.”). 
 60. See id. 
 61. Gustav Radbruch, Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy, rpt. in PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 103-04 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds., 1991); St. Thomas Aquinas, SUMMA 
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theorist any genuine system of law will abide by certain moral 
principles.62 A positive law inconsistent with these principles may not 
necessarily be ignored, but will raise legitimacy concerns about the legal 
system in which the statute was promulgated.63 Other contemporary 
natural law adherents will apply moral judgments when interpreting a 
written provision allowing for alternative interpretations of the positive 
law.64 Despite the differences among the various natural law theories all 
commonly hold the belief that there is an important and necessary 
connection between law and morality, which explains when a legal 
obligation or right exists.  
On the other side of this debate are the legal positivists who deny any 
such connection exists between law and morality. Believing that 
individuals must distinguish the law as it is from the law that ought to be, 
positive law theorists separate the idea of legal and moral rights.65 In 
contrast to the natural law theorists, legal positivists view any deviation 
from the written law as dangerously arbitrary regardless of the “merit or 
demerit” of the provision.66 To a legal positivist moral judgments are 
irrelevant as the written law controls when an obligation is imposed. The 
law is therefore not defined by the subjectivity of moral rights and 
wrongs but rather through objective and enforceable rules. These rules 
derive their power not from moral virtue−as morality is different for 
all−but rather from the decision to enforce the law and hold accountable 
those who violate these binding provisions.67  
  
THEOLOGICA QUESTIONS 90-97 97(Gateway ed. 1992) (“[A] law that is not just, seems to 
be no law at all.” (quoting St. Augustine)). 
 62. ALTMAN, supra note 59, at 54.  
 63. See generally LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964) (discussing the 
natural laws required to create a functioning legal system). 
 64. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 17 (1986)(stating “judges before 
whom a statute is laid need to construct the ‘real’ statute—a statement of what difference 
the statute makes to the legal rights of various people—from the text in the statute 
book.”). 
 65. H.L.A. Hart, supra note 58, at 593. 
 66. See JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
POSITIVE LAW 220 (Robert Campbell 3rd ed. 1869) (“A law, which actually exists, is a 
law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text by which we regulate 
our approbation and disapprobation.”). 
 67. ALTMAN, supra note 59, at 66-76.  
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Each particular legal philosophy obviously has strengths and 
weaknesses. The connection between morality and law espoused by 
natural law theorists ensures that evil actions are not ignored or shielded 
by illogical positive law. However, reliance on morality as the basis for 
determining legal obligations and rights also injects subjectivity, 
arbitrariness, and unpredictability into this determination. By 
disconnecting the law from morality legal positivists eliminate moral 
discernments from discussions concerning legal obligations and rights. 
Yet by disallowing moral judgment, grossly immoral acts and injustices 
may exist if the positive law allows, or inadvertently protects, for such 
acts.68 Though both philosophies are imperfect each offers distinct and 
unique virtues to those trying to determine when a legal obligation or 
right exists.69  
Understanding the general contours of this philosophical debate helps 
answer how and why international law regulates use of military force 
determinations. Both natural law and legal positivism underlie a portion 
of the law of armed conflict, known as jus ad bellum, which “refers to 
the conditions under which one may resort to war or to force in 
general.”70 Jus ad bellum is “governed by an important, but distinct, part 
  
 68. The Nuremburg Trial is a dramatic example of when these “opposing theories 
of the nature of law came into collision.” Id. at 49. Both natural law and legal positivism 
“were part of the debate over Nuremberg” as the trial and the crimes charged were 
unprecedented. Id. For an excellent discussion on how the Nuremberg Trial was a natural 
law and legal positivism amalgamation. See id. at 43-49. 
 69. An alternative to both natural law and legal positivism is legal realism. A 
legal realist dismisses natural law’s reliance on morality and legal positivism’s 
sometimes absurd results. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 
10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). Realism instead is the “accurate recording of things as they 
are, as contrasted with things as they are imagined to be or wished to be or as one feels 
they ought to be.” N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND & KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 192 (1997). Thus, legal realists are pragmatic in their 
approach to the law focusing on “the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for 
desiring them.” Holmes Jr., supra note 69, at 474. This often means that a realist will 
make situation specific decisions based upon a conflux of concerns including what the 
law says, moral judgment, social concerns and political realities. See id. However, this 
pragmatic approach to legal determinations suffers from the same flaws as natural law; 
namely, arbitrariness and subjectivity.  
 70. Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello, 320 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 553, 553 n.1, (Oct. 31, 1997), available at  
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of the international law set out in the United Nations Charter.”71 The 
U.N. Charter, drafted as a response to the naked aggression of the Axis 
powers,72 prohibits the threat or use of force by any state.73 This 
prohibition is absolute with only two generally recognized exceptions.74 
The first exception reserves to the Security Council the right to 
“determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression” and the power to “decide what measures shall be 
taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security.”75 The 
second exception ensures that states retain the “inherent” right of 
  
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnuu.htm (last visited June 22, 
2013). In contrast, jus in bello “governs the conduct of belligerents during a war, and in a 
broader sense comprises the rights and obligations of neutral parties as well.” Id. Jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello together are the law of armed conflict. See Reeves & Lai, supra 
note 20, at 140-42. 
 71. ICRC, Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, What is 
International Humanitarian Law? 1, available at  
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
See also DESKBOOK, supra note 9, at 29 (“modern jus ad bellum (the law governing a 
State’s resort to force) is reflected in the United Nations (UN) Charter.”). 
 72. See U.N. Charter pmbl. (“We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind.”). 
 73. Id. at art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state . . . .”). The U.N. Charter’s general prohibition on the use of force echoes the 
ban on wars of aggression, or “the renunciation of war as an instrument of national 
policy” agreed to in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. See Treaty Between the United 
States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of 
National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.  
 74. “Consent” is considered by some as a third exception to the general 
prohibition on the use of force. The U.N. Charter allows nations to deal with internal 
domestic matters. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7. If a nation requests “the aid of a fellow 
nation or ally, that fellow nation or ally is free to use force within the boundaries of the 
requesting nation.” CORN ET AL., supra note 46, at 17. But see DESKBOOK, supra note 9, at 
31 (“Consent is not a separate exception to Article 2(4). If a state is using force with the 
consent of host state, then there is no violation of the host state’s territorial integrity or 
political independence; thus, there is no need for an exception to the rule.”).  
 75. U.N. Charter at art. 39.  
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individual or collective self-defense if they are the victims of an armed 
attack.76  
The U.N. Charter’s clear prohibition on an individual state threatening 
or using force is not an accident. The unprecedented destruction and 
devastation of World War II, coupled with the ineffectiveness of earlier 
attempts to end aggressive war,77 demonstrated to world powers the need 
for a collective body of the international community to maintain peace 
and security.78 The result was the creation of the United Nations and the 
drafting of the U.N. Charter.79 The U.N. Charter expressly outlines the 
rights and responsibilities of the collective known as the United 
Nations.80 Chief among these responsibilities is an obligation to suppress 
“acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace”81 and, if necessary, to 
use armed force for the collective good.82 The decision whether there 
exists a threat to international peace, and if a military response is 
justified, is left to the subset of nations that comprise the U.N. Security 
Council.83 The Security Council, empowered by the rest of the 
  
 76. Id. at art. 51.  
 77. These earlier attempts, such as the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact, however did lay the intellectual foundation for the universally recognized ban on 
aggressive war. See DESKBOOK, supra note 9, at 15. For a broader discussion on the 
failure of the pre-World War II attempts at regulating the use of force see CORN ET AL., 
supra note 46, at 2-4. 
 78. History of the Nations: Moscow and Teheran Conferences, UN.ORG, 
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/moscowteheran.shtml (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) 
(“[B]y 1943 all the principal Allied nations were committed to outright victory and, 
thereafter, to an attempt to create a world in which ‘men in all lands may live out their 
lives in freedom from fear and want.’”); DESKBOOK, supra note 9, at 15 (discussing how 
post-World War II the international community recognized the need for a world body 
with greater power to prevent war). 
 79. See U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 80. Id. at art. 1. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at pmbl. 
 83. Id. at art. 39. The Security Council “consists of fifteen members, five of 
which are permanent—China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States—and ten of which are elected for two-year terms, based on geographical 
representation.” CORN ET AL., supra note 46, at 6. Each member has “one vote and nine 
votes are sufficient to take an action, but no resolution, except those of a procedural 
nature, can pass over the veto of one of the permanent five members.” Id. 
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international community, is the final arbiter of these decisions and the 
only source of authority allowing for a military intervention.84 Individual 
nations, therefore, do not have discretion to initiate a war as the U.N. 
Charter makes clear that all states are disallowed from the aggressive use 
of force.85  
The nations who formulated the U.N. Charter envisioned a system in 
which the United Nations, through the Security Council, would control 
the use of force in international law.86 There is no doubt that this vision is 
now reality, and the use of force regulatory framework established in the 
U.N. Charter is binding on the entirety of the world body whether 
through membership87 or customary international law.88 The document 
embodies the legal positivist belief in strict adherence to the law as this 
ensures that individual states are precluded from waging aggressive war. 
  
 84. See id. at 24 (“[M]embers confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their 
behalf.”). 
 85. See History of the United Nations: Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/dumbarton_yalta.shtml (last visited Sept. 
8, 2014) (noting “[t]he essence of the plan was that responsibility for preventing future 
war should be conferred upon the Security Council.”); CORN ET AL., supra note 46, at 4 
(“One of the key goals of the Charter was to establish a presumptive prohibition on the 
use of force by States.”). 
 86. See CORN ET AL., supra note 46, at 12. 
 87. U.N. Member States: On the Record, UNITED NATIONS,  
https://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/whatisms.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) 
(“Currently there are 193 Member States of the United Nations.”); see also U.N. Charter 
art. 25 (Each member agrees to “accept and carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council.”). 
 88. See Military and Paramilitary in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Merits, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 187-190 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua v. United 
States] (finding that the U.N. Charter is customary international law). Customary 
international law results from the general and consistent practice of States followed from 
a sense of legal obligation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE U.S. § 102(2) cmt. c. (1987); see also Customary IHL: Introduction,  
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in_asofcuin #Fn_29_14 (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2014) (stating “customary international law require[d] the presence of two 
elements, namely State practice (usus) and a belief that such practice is required, 
prohibited or allowed, depending on the nature of the rule, as a matter of law (opinion 
juris sive necessitates).”). 
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While a state may disagree with the Security Council’s use of force 
decision they are bound by the U.N. Charter to accept that decision.89 
Allowing a state to act outside the U.N. constructed framework invites a 
return to the arbitrary and subjective wars that led to World War II. Thus, 
the U.N. Charter makes clear that deviations from the Security Council’s 
decision, for any reason, are simply not allowed, as this is the only way 
to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”90  
The U.N. Charter’s bifurcation of a state’s legal authority to engage in 
aggressive warfare from its belief in the wisdom of engaging in 
aggressive warfare is clearly based upon legal positivist reasoning.91 
However, the U.N. Charter is not devoid of the influence of natural law 
as the document allows a state to make an individual use of force 
determination if exercising their inherent right of self-defense.92 This 
right was a well-established international norm prior to the drafting of 
the U.N. Charter and is generally recognized as customary international 
  
 89. Of course the Security Council’s decisions may be construed as subjective; 
however, the international community empowered the Security Council with this 
authority and thus their decisions are lawful commands. See generally ALTMAN, supra 
note 59, at 45-47. Some question whether positive law can be the source for international 
law as “there is no global sovereign who enforces international treaties and agreements.” 
Id. at 46. Others reject this premise by arguing that states have consented to be obligated 
by, and held accountable to, international law. See id. at 47-48.  
 90. See U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 91. As the U.N. Charter is the unquestioned authority on use of force decisions, 
semantics and definitions are clearly important. However, the U.N. Charter does not 
define what “use of force” means leaving some discretion to individual states. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia somewhat addressed this issue 
by stating “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
State or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups within a State.” Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-
94-1AR721, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 
70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). Though not addressing the 
definition directly, this statement infers “that activities that directly lead to an armed 
conflict may be a use of force.” CORN ET AL., supra note 46, at 15.  
 92. U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.”).  
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law.93 The customary definition, most famously outlined in the Caroline 
Doctrine,94 allows a state to use force if they “show a necessity of self-
defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation.”95 But, even if force is necessary, it cannot be 
“unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of 
self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within 
it.”96 Using force in self-defense, according to this customary definition, 
is therefore allowed if it is necessary and used in a proportionate 
manner.97  
Customary international law thus imparts on the state’s independent 
authority to determine when it is necessary to exercise this inherent right. 
According to the language expressed in the Caroline Doctrine, this 
authority is broad and may include using force in an anticipatory manner 
  
 93. See Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 88, at § 187 (“The exception of 
the right of individual or collective self-defence is also, in the view of States, established 
in customary law, as is apparent for example from the terms of Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter, which refers to an ‘inherent right.’”); See also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, 
AGGRESSION, AND SELF DEFENSE 181 (2005). 
 94. A 1837 incident on Lake Erie between the United States and the British 
concerning the Caroline, a U.S. flagged ship, led to correspondence between Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster and the British Foreign Officer Lord Ashburton concerning a state’s 
right to assert self-defense. See generally John J. Merriam, Natural Law and Self-
Defense, 206 MIL. L. REV. 43, 59-61 (2010).  
 95. In this correspondence Webster posited that a State does have an inherent 
right to self-defense, but can only exercise that right if they “show a necessity of self-
defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.” Letter from Daniel Webster, Sec’y of State, to Lord Ashburton, British 
Foreign Officer (Apr. 24, 1841) [hereinafter Webster Letter], available at  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp#web2.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Necessity is generally understood to mean that force should be used as a last 
resort. DESKBOOK, supra note 9, at 35. To comply with proportionality “[s]tates must 
limit the magnitude, scope, and duration of any use of force to that level of force which is 
reasonably necessary to counter a threat or attack.” Id. Some argue for a third defining 
criteria which is immediacy. DINSTEIN, supra note 93, at 242 (noting “war may not be 
undertaken in self-defence long after an isolate armed attack.”); CORN ET AL., supra note 
46, at 19-22 (“Three major principles are generally accepted as governing self-defense 
actions under Article 51: necessity, proportionality, and timeliness.”).  
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to stymie an imminent armed attack.98 Some disagree vehemently with 
this idea arguing that a plain reading of the U.N. Charter’s Article 51 
supplants the expansive customary definition of self-defense and any 
independent right asserted by a state.99 Noting that the language of 
Article 51 only allows for self-defense after an armed attack and then 
only until the Security Council takes action these “strict constructionists” 
believe the Charter has preempted the customary understandings.100 Yet 
this argument is incomplete as it does not account for the Charter’s 
express recognition that it cannot impair the inherent right of self-
defense nor does it address what constitutes an armed attack. Further, 
even under the most restrictive interpretation of Article 51 the document 
recognizes that an actual armed attack will necessitate a proportionate 
self-defense response.101 While “[t]here is clearly no common 
understanding of the application” of Article 51 to state action it is 
apparent that some authority exists for a state to act in self-defense.102  
The U.N. Charter expressly enshrines the inherent right of self-
defense in recognition that reason and instinct will drive a state to 
respond to an attack. While there is a debate whether this inherent right is 
  
 98. See Webster Letter, supra note 95; DESKBOOK, supra note 9, at 37 (“Secretary 
Webster posited that a State need not suffer an actual armed attack before taking 
defensive action, but may engage in anticipatory self defense . . . .”).  
 99. See DINSTEIN, supra note 93, at 183. However, Professor Dinstein does allow 
for anticipatory action if an armed attack has been launched in an irrevocable way. Id. at 
191.  
 100. This group believes that “the right [to self-defense] is no more than as granted 
in the Charter and must, therefore, be understood in conjunction with other Charter 
provisions limiting the resort to force.” CORN ET AL., supra note 46, at 22. Under this 
restrictive view a state acting in self-defense would need to gain authority from the 
Security Council prior to responding with force. Id. See also Sean D. Murphy, The 
Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699, 706-17 (addressing to what 
extent a customary international law right to self-defense exists and coining the term 
U.N. “strict constructionists”); Merriam, supra note 94, at 62-68. 
 101. There is a general consensus on the principles that apply to a use of force in 
self-defense. See CORN ET AL., supra note 46, at 19. 
 102. Id. See also TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER WARFARE 63 (Michael Schmitt ed., 2013) (“Textually, Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter refers to a situation in which ‘an armed attack occurs.’ Clearly, this 
covers incidents in which the effects of the armed attack have already materialized . . . 
.”). 
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expansive or restrictive what is inarguable is that in certain self-defense 
circumstances a state determines if proportionate force is necessary to 
respond.103 It is this independent discretion in exercising the inherent 
right that echoes the natural law theorist belief that a connection exists 
between law and morality.104 The ambiguities in Article 51 invite a state 
to use moral judgment to interpret the provision and determine when the 
inherent right of self-defense is triggered.105 This allows a state to equate 
the legal right to use force in self-defense with the moral determination 
that it is necessary. Additionally, interpreting the U.N. Charter to prohibit 
a state from defending itself from an attack is easily dismissed as an 
“injustice”106 and raises legitimacy issues for the remainder of the U.N. 
use of force framework. Exercising the inherent right of self-defense is 
therefore intentionally at the subjective discretion of a victimized state as 
attempting to eliminate independent moral judgment from this decision 
subverts the state’s inalienable right to respond to an armed attack.107  
The U.N. Charter relies on both natural law and legal positivism in the 
development of the modern jus ad bellum with both traditions informing 
the law that governs when a state may resort to using force. The Charter, 
however, only allows for a “moral” or independent use of force 
determination when a state is exercising the inherent right of self-
  
 103. See Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 88, at § 187 (“The Parties, who 
consider the existence of this right to be established as a matter of customary 
international law, agree in holding that whether the response to an attack is lawful 
depends on the observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the 
measures taken in self-defence.”); CORN ET AL., supra note 46, at 19; DESKBOOK, supra 
note 9, at 35 (“Inherent in modern jus ad bellum is the customary requirement that all 
uses of force satisfy both the necessity and proportionality criteria.”). 
 104. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 102, at 62 (“Necessity is judged from 
the perspective of the victim State.”). 
 105. See CORN ET AL., supra note 46, at 19-26 (noting that there are a variety of 
different viewpoints on the inherent right of self-defense amongst states). 
 106. See Merriam, supra note 94, at 58 (“Self-defense under natural law is 
unrestrictive because, while it can be limited to some extent, it can never be taken away 
entirely; a law that purports to eliminate the right to self-defense would be unjust.”). 
 107. See id. at 61 (stating “when Webster articulated his famous formula for 
anticipatory self-defense in the language of the natural law, it was easily understood and 
accepted by his British counterparts because they drew on the same natural law tradition 
of self-defense”). 
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defense. This allowance for subjective moral judgments in self-defense 
determinations is recognition that prohibiting a sovereign state from 
protecting their population and territory is impractical, unreasonable,108 
and contrary to the purpose of the Charter.109 This exception aside,110 the 
remainder of the document is an example of the positivist belief that 
compliance with the written law is non-negotiable regardless of 
subjective intent and perceived moral imperatives. This is particularly 
important as the Charter absolutely prohibits military intervention 
outside of the collective judgment of the international community.111 
Knowing, from personal experience, the consequences of states 
possessing independent authority to initiate a war, the post-World War II 
world body intentionally divorced moral reasoning from legal 
justification in use of force decisions.112 The U.N. Charter makes clear 
that any independent threat or use of force, not an exercise of the 
inherent right of self-defense, is illegal and violates international law.  
  
 108. See id. at 65-67 for an excellent argument on why the inherent right of self-
defense is an expression of natural law. 
 109. The purpose of the United Nations is to ensure that “the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state” is not threatened or violated by force. U.N. Charter 
art. 2, para. 4. Prohibiting a state from protecting their territorial integrity or political 
independence in self-defense is the antithesis of this idea. 
 110. It is possible to argue that by allowing a state to subjectively determine when 
it may act in self-defense allows for acts of aggression. However, a state is still prohibited 
from using force unless it has complied with both the necessity and proportionality 
criteria. See Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 88, at § 187; DESKBOOK, supra note 
9, at 35. Additionally, if the state is acting in anticipation of an imminent attack it must 
demonstrate that “a failure to act at that moment would reasonably be expected to result 
in the State being unable to defend itself effectively when that attack actually starts.” 
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 102, at 65. Though outside the scope of this article, what is 
a legal act in self-defense becomes a more difficult question when a state invokes the 
right to use force to preempt an attack in contrast to responding to an imminent attack. 
See generally Michael Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 513 (2003). 
 111. See supra text and accompanying notes 77-90. 
 112. See U.N. Charter pmbl. (“We the peoples of the United Nations determined to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind . . . .”). 
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IV.  INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, AND 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
A use of force justified under the concept of humanitarian 
intervention is a clear violation of the U.N. Charter and is without the 
force of law.113 The foundation of a humanitarian intervention is the 
belief that a moral imperative to stop an ongoing crisis legally justifies 
using military force.114 A state relying on this use of force concept is not 
invoking their inherent right of self-defense115 but rather claiming the 
moral authority to act despite the general prohibition outlined in Article 
2(4) of the U.N. Charter. The U.N. Charter, however, does not conflate a 
moral right with a legal right except in a case of self-defense. A 
subjective determination, based upon a moral judgment, that force is 
necessary to stop an ongoing humanitarian crisis is not an individual 
state decision as the international community reserved that right in their 
crafting of the modern jus ad bellum. Any state action not authorized by 
the Security Council is, without exception, presumptively illegal. In 
contrast to R2P, which relies on Security Council approval before using 
force to avert or stop a mass atrocity situation, humanitarian intervention 
is a unilateral use of force.116 This independent decision to conduct a 
humanitarian intervention ignores the Security Council’s non-derogated 
authority to control use of force determinations and is therefore illegal 
under international law. 
For those frustrated with the slaughter in Syria, the inability to legally 
justify an intervention may be viewed as an unconscionable result and a 
clear example of when the legal positivist approach to the U.N. Charter 
should make way for the natural law theorists. This instinct is 
understandable as the atrocities in Syria are terrible; however, the 
unintended consequences of allowing for subjective use of force 
determinations are likely worse. Circumventing the U.N. Charter 
delegitimizes international law and those institutions, including the 
Security Council, constructed to maintain international peace and 
  
 113. Kaye, supra note 47, at 3.  
 114. See supra text and accompanying notes 49-57. 
 115. See generally Anderson, supra note 5. 
 116. See supra text and accompanying notes 38-42. 
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order.117 If the international community loses the legal control over the 
use of force states will again define for themselves when acts of 
aggression are morally justified. The world saw tens of millions of deaths 
in World War I and II as a result of states subjectively determining when 
to wage war 118 and it was this specific reason that first the League of 
Nations119 and later the U.N. Charter were created. Only by centralizing 
control of use of force decisions could the world body significantly 
reduce the devastation caused by international armed conflicts.120  
Humanitarian interventionist may dismiss the idea that attempting to 
stop a mass atrocity, in a place such as Syria will usher in a return of 
aggressive warfare. They may believe that stopping the ongoing 
  
 117. See Kaye, supra note 47. 
 118. Death totals for World War I and II are estimates as the vast number 
casualties make a calculation almost impossible. One estimate puts the death total in 
World War I at approximately 20,000,000. SOURCE LIST AND DETAILED DEATH TOLLS 
FOR THE PRIMARY MEGADEATHS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY,  
http://necrometrics.com/20c5m.htm#WW1 (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). World War II 
estimated deaths are approximately 60,000,000. See THE NATIONAL WWII MUSEUM, BY 
THE NUMBERS: WORLD WIDE DEATHS IN WORLD WAR II,  
http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/ww2-by-
the-numbers/world-wide-deaths.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
 119. See generally League of Nations Covenant pmbl.,  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ leagcov.asp (creating an obligation for states to 
not resort to war to resolve conflicts). 
 120. An international armed conflict exists in “all cases of declared war or of any 
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. Additionally, Protocol I, 
which supplements the Geneva Conventions, also applies “in the situation referred to in 
Article 2” as well as in those “armed conflicts which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right 
of self-determination.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol 
I) Art 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. ¶ 3-4. See also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION 
OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (Jean S. Picte et. al. ed., 
1960) (“Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of 
members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if 
one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war.”). 
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humanitarian crisis is so morally compelling that the vast majority of the 
international community would recognize the need for the intervention. 
While this may be true as an actual humanitarian intervention is 
assuredly well-intended and executed for noble reasons the idea is also 
easily manipulated to justify violating the territorial integrity of a 
sovereign state. For example, in 1939 Nazi Germany claimed a moral 
obligation to protect the ethnic German minority in Czechoslovakia.121 
Hitler “built his case against the country upon the grievances of its 
German minority in the western fringe area called the Sudetenland”122 
and claimed that Germany had a responsibility to protect this group.123 
This claim was obviously a subterfuge as Hitler coveted Czechoslovakia 
as “lebenstraum,” or living space, for his greater vision of Germany.124 
Additionally, Hitler’s “campaign against the Jews” was part of his 
external policy and “it is clear that the conquest of space and the 
destruction of Jewry were inextricably connected in his thoughts.”125 It 
was this ability to use a moral argument, no matter how false, coupled 
with the prerogative to threaten or wage war that inspired the world body 
to prohibit states from subjective determinations concerning the use of 
force.126 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Ukrainian crisis is again, unfortunately, highlighting how easily a 
state may claim the authority to use force to avert a humanitarian crisis. 
  
 121. See GORDON A. CRAIG, GERMANY 1866-1945 703 (1978).  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. In a speech given on September 12, 1938, Hitler stated, “This is a question 
of German folk-comrades! I have no intention of allowing a second Palestine to be 
formed here in the heart of Germany by the labours of other statesmen. . . . . The 
Germans in Czechoslovakia are neither defenceless nor abandoned. Of that you can rest 
assured!” Id. at 704-05 (citing MAX DOMARUS, HITLER: SPEECHES AND PROCLAMATIONS 
1932-1945 VOL. 2 904 (1962)).  
 124. See CRAIG, supra note 121.  
 125. Id. at 709. 
 126. See Schmitt, supra note 4, at 753 (“States have been reticent to openly 
embrace the doctrine for fear that other states will misuse it in order to interfere in the 
affairs of their neighbors.”). 
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On March 1, 2014, Russia invaded the Crimean peninsula, a recognized 
territory of the Ukraine, and occupied the region.127 Russian President 
Vladimir Putin claimed the intervention, in large part, was to defend 
Russian-speaking minorities in the region from “real threats” to life and 
their health,128 to protect against anti-Semitic violence,129 and for a 
number of other humanitarian purposes.130 While these claims are 
dubious131 the arguments used are those of a humanitarian 
interventionist. It is outrageous that President Putin has hijacked the 
concept of humanitarian intervention for his nationalistic agenda and it is 
true that there is no comparison to the atrocities in Syria and the claimed 
humanitarian distress in the Ukraine. Yet this is the consequence, well 
known by those international actors who watched the horrors of the first 
half of the 20th Century, of allowing states to use force on their own 
terms. The desire to stop the mass atrocities in Syria and other 
humanitarian disasters inadvertently undermines the U.N. Charter’s well 
thought out use of force construct and consequently has led the world 
back to the brink of the unthinkable: an international war in the 
Ukraine.132  
  
 127. Tim Sullivan & Vladimir Isachenkov, Russian Troops Take Over Ukraine’s 
Crimea Region, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 1, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/russian-troops-
over-ukraines-crimea-region-200052097.html (“Russian troops took over the strategic 
Crimean peninsula . . . without firing a shot.”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Isi Leibler, Candidly Speaking: Putin, Ukraine and the Jews, JERUSALEM 
POST (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Candidly-speaking-
Putin-Ukraine-and-the-Jews-345546 (“The Russian president has included radical 
nationalism and anti-Semitism in the Ukraine as major justifications for his 
intervention.”). 
 130. See Transcript: Putin defends Russian Intervention in Ukraine, supra note 
17.  
 131. Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 
Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, at a UN Security Council Meeting on Ukraine, (Mar. 1, 2014), available at 
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/222780.htm; Torry & Benoit, supra note 57, at 
A10. 
 132. Garry Kasparov, Cut Off the Russian Oligarchs and They’ll Dump Putin, 
WALL ST. J., MAR. 7, 2014 at A15 (“If Mr. Putin succeeds—and if there is no united 
Western response he will have succeeded regardless of whether or not Russian troops 
stay in Crimea—the world, or at least the world order, as we know it, will have ended.”). 
228 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.1  
 
So what can be done to address the violence in Syria? While a 
military intervention is prohibited by international law,133 there are a 
wide range of measures available that fall below the threshold of force 
that triggers the Article 2(4) prohibition.134 A non-exhaustive list of 
options may include providing political, economic, diplomatic, and 
tangential military support for those trying to stop the humanitarian 
crisis. These same tools are also available to internationally isolate those 
responsible for the Syrian crisis. It is also possible to force the 
benefactors and facilitators of this particular mass atrocity situation to 
explain to the entirety of the international community why they are 
shielding a regime capable of using chemical weapons on their own 
people. Those desiring to stop the crisis should work within the 
traditional legal framework of the U.N. Charter to repeatedly make a 
case for Security Council Resolutions authorizing the use of force. 
Though these measures will be vetoed over and over again the 
willingness to protect genocidal war criminals can only diminish the 
international moral stature of the vetoing state.  
Sadly, the humanitarian crisis in Syria is one mass atrocity situation 
among many and these suggestions are insufficient and are not a long-
term solution. Force is often the only way to stop a state from 
committing mass atrocities against its own population and perhaps a 
more assertive form of R2P is yet to emerge that will finally combine 
“R2P as law” and “R2P as a set of normative ideals.”135 However, the 
solution must include the U.N. Charter’s methodology for regulating use 
of force. The document is not an anachronism from another era but rather 
a form of protection from the brutality and savagery of aggressive war. 
  
 133. See generally Schmitt, supra note 4, at 744-56 (analyzing all possible legal 
justifications for a military intervention in Syria). 
 134. For a discussion on what constitutes a “use of force,” see TALLINN MANUAL, 
supra note 102, at 45-48. See also Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 25/2625, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 
(Oct. 24, 1970), available at  
http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm (listing activities that constitute a use of 
force). 
 135. Kersten, supra note 21 (“R2P as law and R2P as a set of normative ideals are 
often in tension.”). 
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The Ukrainian crisis illustrates just how fragile the modern jus ad bellum 
legal construct is and how quickly we could see the reemergence of an 
international armed conflict. Abba Eban, the famous Israeli foreign 
minister, once stated that “international law is that law which the wicked 
do not obey and the righteous do not enforce.”136 The incontrovertible 
evidence of mass atrocities in Syria and the indefensible act of 
aggression by Russia against the Ukraine reinforces the truth that the 
wicked continue to ignore international norms. The challenge for the 
United States and its allies is to prove Mr. Eban wrong by enforcing 
international law. The question is whether they can remain righteous in 
doing so.  
 
  
 136. Nora Ryell, Professor Spent His Lifetime Defending International Law 
Around the World, GLOBALLIFE (Jan. 27, 2012),  
http://v1.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20120127.OBGREENATL/BDAStory/
BDA/ deaths.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
